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Contaminated Relationships in the Opioid Crisis
ELISSA PHILIP GENTRY† & BENJAMIN J. MCMICHAEL†
Unlike past public health crises, the opioid crisis arose from within the healthcare system itself.
Entities within that system, particularly opioid manufacturers, may bear some liability in sparking
and perpetuating the current crisis. Unsurprisingly, the allegations underlying the thousands of
claims filed in connection with the opioid crisis differ substantially. However, almost all of those
claims rely, to some degree, on the strength of the relationship between opioid manufacturers and
the healthcare providers who prescribed their products. This Article argues that the underlying
relationship is the heart of the crisis and that this problematic relationship is by no means a thing
of the past.
This Article provides critically important empirical evidence on the provider-manufacturer
relationship. Analyzing a novel dataset constructed solely for this Article, the Article examines
the role of payments from pharmaceutical companies to healthcare providers in inducing the
latter to prescribe more opioids. This analysis reveals robust and consistent empirical evidence
that pharmaceutical companies continue to pay healthcare providers, and providers receiving
higher levels of payments prescribe more opioids. This analysis is limited to legal payments, so it
cannot establish any basis of liability by itself. However, the relationships elucidated by this
empirical evidence are the types that can facilitate the activities plaintiffs in the ongoing opioid
litigation have alleged. Thus, the evidence developed and presented in this Article provides
critically important insight into the role of manufacturers in the opioid crisis and into the litigation
that crisis has generated.
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INTRODUCTION
Are the forces fueling the opioid epidemic truly extinguished? To believe
so is tremendously tempting: for the first time since the crisis’s beginning,
opioid-related deaths declined in 2018.1 In the wake of the devastation wreaked
by the epidemic, litigation accelerated, with victims and governments filing
hundreds of claims. Though different theories underlie these claims, many share
a common component—the relationship between the pharmaceutical companies
that manufacture opioids and the healthcare providers who prescribe them. This
Article argues that this relationship is at the heart of the opioid crisis and presents
empirical evidence suggesting that, despite being past the peak of the crisis, the
current relationship between payments from pharmaceutical companies and
opioid prescriptions remains problematic.
The opioid crisis represents the greatest threat to the public health of this
generation.2 Near the peak of the crisis in 2017, an American died every eleven
minutes from a drug overdose involving an opioid.3 Unlike public health crises
of the past—such as the influenza pandemic of the late 1910s or the spread of
the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) of the 1980s and 1990s—the opioid
epidemic arose within the healthcare system itself. Indeed, a former Director of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has explained that the opioid crisis
“start[ed] in doctor’s offices and hospitals.”4
The opioid crisis began in earnest around 2000,5 and over the next fifteen
years, the number of opioid prescriptions quadrupled.6 This explosion in
prescription opioid use has led to profound consequences. By 2015, over 63%
of the 52,404 drug overdose deaths recorded by the Centers for Disease Control
1. Holly Hedegaard, Arialdi M. Miniño & Margaret Warner, Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States,
1999–2018, 356 NCHS DATA BRIEF, Jan. 2020, at 1, 1.
2. See RICHARD J. BONNIE, MORGAN A. FORD & JONATHAN K. PHILLIPS, PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE
OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE
187 (2017) (“Not since the HIV/AIDS epidemic has the United States faced as devastating and lethal a health
problem as the current crisis of opioid misuse and overdose and opioid use disorder (OUD).”).
3. The Evolution of the Opioid Crisis: 2000–2017, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. (Aug. 2019),
https://www.nihcm.org/categories/the-evolution-of-the-opioid-crisis-2000-2017; The Evolution of the Opioid
Crisis: 2000–2018, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. (May 2020), https://nihcm.org/publications/theevolution-of-the-opioid-crisis-2000-2018.
4. WHITE HOUSE COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS, DRAFT INTERIM
REPORT 1 (July 31, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ondcp/commission-interimreport.pdf.
5. See Richard C. Dart, Hilary L. Surratt, Theodore J. Cicero, Mark W. Parrino, S. Geoff Severtson, Becki
Bucher-Bartelson & Jody L. Green, Trends in Opioid Analgesic Abuse and Mortality in the United States, 372
NEW ENG. J. MED. 241, 242 (2015); Marcia K. Merboth & Susan Barnason, Managing Pain: The Fifth Vital
Sign, 35 NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 375, 377 (2000); Rose A. Rudd, Noah Aleshire, Jon E. Zibbell & R. Matthew
Gladden, Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths—United States, 2000–2014, 64 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1378, 1378–82 (2016); D. Andrew Tompkins, J. Greg Hobelmann & Peggy Compton,
Providing Chronic Pain Management in the “Fifth Vital Sign” Era: Historical and Treatment Perspectives on
a Modern-Day Medical Dilemma, 173 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S11, S12–18 (2017); Michael R. Von
Korff & Gary Franklin, Responding to America’s Iatrogenic Epidemic of Prescription Opioid Addiction and
Overdose, 54 MED. CARE 426, 428 (2016).
6. Rudd et al., supra note 5, at 1378–82.
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and Prevention (CDC) involved an opioid.7 The opioid crisis’s collateral
damage, however, has not been limited to deaths. Increased opioid use has fueled
growth in opioid addiction rates,8 opioid-related traffic accidents,9 admissions
to facilities for substance abuse,10 opioid-related emergency room visits,11
opioid-related hospital admissions,12 and the occurrence of neonatal abstinence
syndrome (infants born addicted to opioids).13 Experts have estimated the costs
of the opioid epidemic to hospitals alone at roughly $11 billion annually,14 and
the societal costs at over $95 billion.15 Once the value of lost human life is
included, the costs surge to over $500 billion.16
This overwhelming impact begs for a tractable policy solution; however,
the disjointed evolution of the opioid crisis—and the role that illegal opioids
have played—have complicated efforts to address the crisis. The CDC has
classified the opioid crisis into three separate waves based on the type of opioids
responsible for increases in opioid-related deaths.17 A surge in the use of
prescription opioids, including those legally prescribed by healthcare providers,
ignited the first wave of the crisis around 2000.18 During the second wave in
2011, heroin—illicitly manufactured and distributed outside the healthcare
7. Rose A. Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David & Lawrence Scholl, Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved
Overdose Deaths—United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1145, 1145 (2016).
8. Andrew Kolodny, David T. Courtwright, Catherine S. Hwang, Peter Kreiner, John L. Eadie, Thomas
W. Clark & G. Caleb Alexander, The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health Approach to an
Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 559 (2015).
9. Guohua Li & Stanford Chihuri, Prescription Opioids, Alcohol and Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes: A
Population-Based Case-Control Study, 6 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 1–3 (2019).
10. Andrew S. Huhn, Eric C. Strain, D. Andrew Tompkins & Kelly E. Dunn, A Hidden Aspect of the U.S.
Opioid Crisis: Rise in First-Time Treatment Admissions for Older Adults with Opioid Use Disorder, 193 DRUG
& ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 142, 142 (2018).
11. Christopher M. Jones & Jana K. McAninch, Emergency Department Visits and Overdose Deaths from
Combined Use of Opioids and Benzodiazepines, 49 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 493, 497–500 (2015).
12. Hilary Mosher, Yunshou Zhou, Andrew L. Thurman, Mary Vaughan Sarrazin & Michael E. Ohl,
Trends in Hospitalization for Opioid Overdose Among Rural Compared to Urban Residents of the United States,
2007–2014, 12 J. HOSP. MED. 925, 925 (2017); Jennifer P. Stevens, Michael J. Wall, Lena Novack, John
Marshall, Douglas J. Hsu & Michael D. Howell, The Critical Care Crisis of Opioid Overdoses in the United
States, 14 ANNALS AM. THORACIC SOC’Y 1803, 1808 (2017).
13. Neonatal abstinence syndrome occurs when an infant born to an opioid-addicted mother experiences
symptoms of opioid withdrawal. Stephen W. Patrick, Robert E. Schumacher, Brian D. Benneyworth, Elizabeth
E. Krans, Jennifer M. McAllister & Matthew M. Davis, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and Associated Health
Care Expenditures: United States, 2000–2009, 307 JAMA 1934, 1934–37 (2012).
14. Press Release, Premier, Opioid Overdoses Costing U.S. Hospitals an Estimated $11 Billion Annually
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.premierinc.com/newsroom/press-releases/opioid-overdoses-costing-u-s-hospitalsan-estimated-11-billion-annually.
15. See CORWIN N. RHYAN, THE POTENTIAL SOCIETAL BENEFIT OF ELIMINATING OPIOID OVERDOSES,
DEATHS, AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS EXCEEDS $95 BILLION PER YEAR 1 (2017), https://altarum.org/sites/
default/files/uploaded-publication-files/Research-Brief_Opioid-Epidemic-Economic-Burden.pdf.
16. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20th
e%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf.
17. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
18. The Evolution of the Opioid Crisis: 2000–2017, supra note 3.
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system—became a salient part of the crisis.19 A third wave emerged in 2013,
characterized by synthetic opioids—substances that mimic naturally occurring
opioids such as codeine and morphine and tend to be highly potent.20 These
synthetic opioids, which may be produced and distributed through legal or illegal
channels, contributed to many accidental overdoses, particularly when synthetic
opioids were mistaken for, or mixed with, traditional opioids.21
The growth in deaths attributable to illicit opioids has caused some
confusion about the responsibility of the healthcare system for the opioid crisis.
Illegal drug usage is neither new nor unique to the opioid crisis. Illegal opioid
use, however, differs from other illegal drug use in the closeness of its
connection with the modern healthcare system. Prescription opioid use is often
the catalyst for subsequent abuse of illegal opioids, as “the majority of users start
taking opioids that are prescribed by their physicians, even if they later progress
to illicit or illegal opioid use.”22 Scott Gottlieb, the former Commissioner of the
FDA, explained that “[m]ost people who become addicted to opioids become
medically addicted. Their first exposure is going to be a clinical prescription that
they receive in a clinical setting, and then they’ll go on to develop an
addiction.”23
Accordingly, despite the uptick in deaths attributable to illegal opioids, the
heart of the opioid crisis remains within the healthcare system. Indeed, the use
of illegal substances does not necessarily limit the responsibility of the
healthcare system in the opioid crisis, as recently recognized by West Virginia—
one of the states hardest hit by the opioid crisis.24 In Tug Valley Pharmacy v. All
Plaintiffs, the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to hold that the illegal
consumption of opioids bars the imposition of liability on healthcare providers

19. Id.
20. See Synthetic Opioid Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/fentanyl.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2021); Opioid Data Analysis and
Resources, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021). Examples include tramadol and fentanyl, which may be produced and distributed
through legal or illegal channels. See Opioid Data Analysis and Resources, supra; Synthetic Opioid Overuse
Data, supra.
21. See Synthetic Opioid Overdose Data, supra note 20.
22. Janet Currie, Jonas Y. Jin & Molly Schnell, U.S. Employment and Opioids: Is There a Connection? 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24440, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/
working_papers/w24440/w24440.pdf (“The epidemic is particularly shocking since the majority of users start
taking opioids that are prescribed by their physicians, even if they later progress to illicit or illegal opioid use.”);
Jennifer L. Doleac & Anita Mukherjee, The Moral Hazard of Lifesaving Innovations: Naloxone Access, Opioid
Abuse, and Crime 6 (IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 11489, 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11489.pdf
(“Individuals are prescribed these drugs to treat pain, but many patients develop addictions that lead them to
illegal use of prescription opioids and cheaper substitutes such as heroin.”).
23. FDA’s Scott Gottlieb: Opioid Addiction Is FDA’s Biggest Crisis Now, CNBC (July 21, 2017, 8:24
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2017/07/21/fdas-scott-gottlieb-opioid-addiction-is-fdas-biggest-crisisnow.html.
24. See Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo Cty., 773 S.E.2d 627, 628 (W. Va.
2015).
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for their role in allowing patients to become addicted to opioids.25 Importantly,
the court held that the criminal consumption of illicit opioids by the patients does
not extinguish the liability of the providers who originally prescribed legal
opioids.26 This decision provides an appropriate lens for the opioid crisis. While
illegal opioids may have risen in importance based on the number of deaths
caused, the path to those deaths often begins with legal prescription opioids.27
Given the importance of initial prescriptions of opioids and the follow-on
effects of opioid over-prescription, this Article focuses on the relationship that
arguably ignited the crisis: the relationship between pharmaceutical companies
and the physicians who prescribe opioids. Part I examines the importance of the
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and providers in initiating and
perpetuating the opioid crisis. It details why, despite the multiplicity of claims
made in the current litigation, the prescriber-pharmaceutical company
relationship underlies almost all claims filed in connection with the opioid crisis.
Given the importance of this relationship, Part II describes a theoretical model
that differentiates between pharmaceutical companies playing a purely unbiased
educational role and inappropriately persuading healthcare providers to
prescribe more opioids. Part II also relies on this model to develop testable
hypotheses about the nature of the relationship between pharmaceutical
companies and prescribers.
Part III uses empirical analysis to test the hypotheses developed in Part II.
Using statistical matching techniques to match multiple data sources, Part III
provides novel evidence on the relationship between pharmaceutical payments
and physician prescriptions. In general, the evidence suggests that payments
from pharmaceutical companies are associated with increases in opioid
prescriptions. Further, by exploiting the passage of state laws meant to educate
providers on the prevalence of opioid prescriptions, Part III shows that this
positive correlation is more consistent with pharmaceutical companies
persuading healthcare providers to prescribe more opioids than with a legitimate
educational function. Part IV examines the implications of these results,
concluding that the continued importance of pharmaceutical payments in
prescription decisions is problematic. It argues that this continued importance
may support claims within the current opioid litigation. Part IV also explores the
role of current state legislation in combatting the contamination within the
manufacturer-provider relationship.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 636.
27. See WHITE HOUSE COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS, supra note 4, at
1.
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I. ORIGINS OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC AND THE PRESCRIBERPHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY RELATIONSHIP
The existence of the opioid crisis is as apparent as its origins are murky. As
noted above, several factors have contributed to the opioid crisis. For example,
underlying issues of mental health and socioeconomic instability may drive the
demand for illegal opioids.28 Relatedly, economic challenges for middle-aged
whites without a college degree stemming from deindustrialization and cuts to
social safety nets have been blamed for the rise of “diseases of despair”—drug
overdose, alcohol-related disease, and suicide—which are often tightly
connected with the opioid crisis.29 These factors are perceived to have increased
the long-term demand for opioids, particularly illegal opioids.30 However, the
focus here is the role of the relationship between providers and pharmaceutical
companies in creating the initial demand for opioids and in supplying much of
the prescription drugs that began the crisis two decades ago.
This Part examines the origins of the opioid epidemic and argues that it
evolved from a mixture of well-meaning policies aimed at addressing
undertreated pain and misleading scientific information from pharmaceutical
companies. In July 2017, the White House Commission on Combating Drug
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis explained that the opioid crisis “start[s] in
doctor’s offices and hospitals.”31 In offering this explanation, the Commission
did not blame physicians, and this Article similarly does not seek to offer blanket
accusations against those on the front lines of healthcare. However,
understanding the opioid crisis necessarily requires understanding changes in
physicians’ approaches to pain management and opioid prescribing. This Part
begins by exploring changes in these approaches that led to an increase in opioid
prescriptions. In turn, the excess supply of opioids generated by such overprescription fueled the crisis in at least three ways: (1) patients who are legally
prescribed opioids for an extended period of time are more likely to become
addicted, (2) the excess supply is diverted from legal uses and used by those
without a prescription, or (3) the excess supply is sold on the black market.
Well-meaning prescribers were not alone in causing the opioid crisis,
however. Pharmaceutical manufacturers took several courses of action which
may have contributed to the current epidemic. Although some scholars maintain
that the increase in supply was an unfortunate consequence of a genuine desire
to cater to an undertreated population, a more cynical explanation—and one
which is gaining popular and legal traction—views the development of the
opioid crisis as a foreseeable consequence of interference by pharmaceutical

28. See Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and
Economic Determinants, 108 AJPH PERSPS. 182, 183 (2018).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. WHITE HOUSE COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS, supra note 4, at 1.
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companies.32 This interference took various forms, including the use of false and
misleading advertising.33 Understanding the strategies these companies used to
become involved in providers’ prescribing decisions gives important context for
the empirical analysis presented below.
A. THE UNDERTREATMENT OF PAIN
The initial change in prescribing patterns that precipitated the opioid crisis
was spurred by the noblest of factors: (1) the recognition that pain has
traditionally been undertreated, and (2) new evidence supporting the safety of
opioids. Studies in the 1990s highlighted the systematic under-treatment of both
cancer and non-cancer pain.34 Related research suggested that inadequate
treatment of pain disproportionately affected racial minorities and the elderly,
noting the “significant disparities between those who received analgesic
treatment for pain, particularly among racial and ethnic minorities as well as for
differences in age.”35
In response to such studies, two significant policy changes ensured that
physicians would pay more attention to patient pain. First, the Joint
Commission, an organization that monitors hospitals and medical centers and
promulgates standards for accreditation, revised its standards for treating pain.36
The new standards “emphasized the need to perform systematic assessments of
patients’ pain levels regularly and frequently while hospitalized.”37 Because
Joint Commission accreditation of hospitals and medical centers is often relied
upon by state governments in quality oversight,38 these elevated standards
encouraged providers to treat pain more aggressively.
Second, and working in conjunction with the Joint Commissions’ new
standards, the government changed the way it incorporated patient satisfaction
as a measure of hospital quality. In response to an Institute of Medicine report
criticizing the quality of health care in the United States, Congress required the

32. See Scott G. Weiner, Sayeed K. Malek & Christin N. Price, The Opioid Crisis and Its Consequences,
101 TRANSPLANTATION 678, 679 (2017).
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. See Weiner et al., supra note 32, at 679; Teresa A. Rummans, M. Caroline Burton & Nancy L. Dawson,
How Good Intentions Contributed to Bad Outcomes: The Opioid Crisis, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 344, 346 (2018).
35. Weiner et al., supra note 32, at 679 (citing Salimah H. Meghani, Eeeseung Byun & Rollin M.
Gallagher, Time to Take Stock: A Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review of Analgesic Treatment Disparities for
Pain in the United States, 13 PAIN MED. 150, 151 (2012); Karen O. Anderson, Carmen R. Green & Richard
Payne, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain: Causes and Consequences of Unequal Care, 10 J. PAIN 1187,
1187–89 (2009); Alexie Cintron & R. Sean Morrison, Pain and Ethnicity in the United States: A Systematic
Review, 9 J. PALLIAT. MED. 1454, 1454–56 (2006); and Ula Hwang, Laura K. Belland, Daniel A. Handel, Kabir
Yadav, Kennon Heard, Laura Rivera-Reyes, Amanda Eisenberg, Matthew J. Noble, Sudha Mekala, Morgan
Valley, Gary Winkel, Knox H. Todd & Sean R. Morrison, Is All Pain Is Treated Equally? A Multicenter
Evaluation of Acute Pain Care by Age, 155 PAIN 2568, 2568–72 (2014)).
36. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 346.
37. Id.
38. State Recognition, JOINT COMM’N, https://www.jointcommission.org/en/accreditation-andcertification/state-recognition/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to promulgate the Hospital
Consumer of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey to measure quality.39 To
address the concern about patient experience, three out of the twenty-five
questions in this survey inquired about how well hospital providers managed
patients’ pain.40 Because this measure affected providers’ reimbursement from
Medicare, they began concentrating on delivering more intensive pain
management treatments.41 Thus, a well-intentioned effort to increase the quality
of medical services resulted in an overemphasis on the provision of pain
medication.
Compounding these various institutional factors pushing physicians to treat
pain more intensively was the recognition of “a moral imperative for physicians
to treat pain and relieve suffering.”42 The moral obligation is documented in the
Declaration of Montreal, which recognized the “fundamental human right” of
pain management.43 That document acknowledges “[t]he right of all people to
have access to pain management without discrimination,” and emphasizes the
“inadequate access to treatment for acute pain” and the “severe restrictions on
the availability of opioids and other essential medications, [which are] critical to
the management of pain.”44 Similarly, scholarly work began to emphasize the
importance of pain as a “fifth vital sign,” encouraging physicians to treat it more
aggressively.45 In 1996, the American Academy of Pain Medicine and the
American Pain Society issued a statement arguing that opioids should be used
even in chronic noncancer pain.46
In response to this increase in opioid use, most states passed intractable
pain statutes.47 These states provided safe harbors for physicians prescribing
long-term opioid therapy.48 Further insulated from board discipline, spurred by
a sense of professional duty, and incentivized by institutional evaluations that
affected payment, physicians unsurprisingly increased opioid prescription
rates.49 Importantly, however, these factors alone were not enough to spark the

39. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 346–347.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 346.
42. Weiner et al., supra note 32, at 679.
43. Id.
44. Declaration of Montréal, INT’L ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN, https://www.iasp-pain.org/Declaration
ofMontreal?navItemNumber=582 (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
45. Merboth & Barnason, supra note 5, at 377; Tompkins et al., supra note 5, at S11–S21; Richard A.
Mularski, Foy White-Chu, Devorah Overbay, Lois Miller, Steven M. Asch & Linda Ganzini, Measuring Pain
as the 5th Vital Sign Does Not Improve Quality of Pain Management, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 607, 607
(2006).
46. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 345.
47. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., PAIN MANAGEMENT POLICIES, https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/
advocacy/key-issues/pain-management-by-state.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (listing statutes by state).
48. Id. at 345–46. The level of protection provided by each statute varies, but physicians were somewhat
protected from discipline for long-term opioid prescription. Id.
49. Id. at 345–48.
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opioid crisis. As the following Subpart details, pharmaceutical companies
played a vital role as well.
B. NEW INFORMATION ON OPIOIDS FROM PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
As providers and regulators increasingly acknowledged and even touted
the benefits of pain management with opioids, emerging research began to
suggest that the risk of harm associated with these medications—including
addiction—was lower than previously believed.50 Plaintiffs in the current
litigation assert, however, that much of this research was paid for by the
pharmaceutical industry and did not offer valid scientific conclusions.51 Indeed,
several particularly relevant announcements, which fell far below the standard
of rigorous research, garnered disproportionate attention and credibility.52
These focal announcements spurred the push for more opioids.53 For example, a
one-paragraph letter in the New England Journal of Medicine reported the
results of a retrospective review of pain patients, finding that only 4 of the 11,882
patients became addicted.54 This letter was cited over 600 times as support for
providers seeking to expand the use of prescription opioids.55 Similarly, in 1998,
Purdue Pharma (“Purdue”)—an opioid manufacturer at the center of many
current lawsuits—circulated a video entitled “I Got My Life Back,” which
documented six patients whose chronic, non-cancer pain was treated by
opioids.56 Following this promotional message, prescriptions for OxyContin
increased from 670,000 in 1997 to 6.2 million in 2002, and the total number of
opioid prescriptions increased by 45 million.57
In addition to media attention, research on “pseudoaddiction” encouraged
physicians to continue prescribing opioids to patients who appeared to suffer
similar symptoms as addicts. Researchers David Weissman and J. David
Haddox first outlined pseudoaddiction in 1989.58 David Haddox later became a
Senior Medical Director for Purdue.59 Designated an “iatrogenic” syndrome, a
syndrome induced by a healthcare provider as opposed to arising from natural
causes,60 pseudoaddiction ostensibly affects patients receiving inadequate pain

50. See Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 345.
51. See infra Part I.C.
52. See Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 345.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 346.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Marion S. Greene & R. Andrew Chambers, Pseudoaddiction: Fact or Fiction? An Investigation of the
Medical Literature, 2 CURRENT ADDICTION REPS. 310, 311 (2015).
59. Complaint at 55, Bradford Cnty. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-00702 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2019).
60. Iatrogenic is defined as a condition “induced inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical
treatment or diagnostic procedures.” Iatrogenic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/iatrogenic?src=search-dict-box (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). Greene and Chambers note that in
describing pseudoaddiction as an iatrogenic disease, Weissman and Haddox flipped the definition on its head
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management.61 Patients suffering from pseudoaddiction supposedly progress
through three separate phases. First, a patient experiencing pain receives
inadequate pain management and requests additional medication.62 Second, the
patient learns that in order to receive more medication, he or she must convince
his or her physician of the need for such medication.63 Third, the patient engages
in drug-seeking behavior, creating mistrust in the physician-patient
relationship.64 The described symptoms of pseudoaddiction, perhaps
unsurprisingly, are almost indistinguishable from true addiction.65 Unlike the
treatment for true addiction, however, research on pseudoaddiction
recommended that physicians prescribe more, and not fewer, opioids.66 A later
study analyzing the medical literature regarding the validity of pseudoaddiction
concluded that empirical evidence does not support its existence.67
In addition to the literature on pseudoaddiction, a few key opinion
leaders—later alleged to have been paid by pharmaceutical companies68—
became prolific sources of research, concluding that opioids are safe. A notable
example is Dr. Russell Portenoy. Portenoy—hired as a consultant by several
pharmaceutical companies—advocated for the increased use of opioids,
particularly in the treatment of non-cancer pain.69 Dubbed the “King of Pain,”70
he published an article based on a study of thirty-eight cases, concluding that
opioid treatment can be a safe option for patients with intractable non-malignant
pain and no history of drug abuse.71 He also allegedly served as a member of the
American Pain Society and American Academy of Pain Medicine Guidelines
Committee, organizations which “endorsed [the use of] opioids to treat chronic
[non-cancer] pain.”72 Later, in exchange for legal immunity, Portenoy admitted
that pharmaceutical companies “‘overstated the benefits of chronic-opioid
therapy’ and ‘understated the risks of opioids, particularly the risk of abuse,
addiction and overdose.’”73
since pseudoaddiction is theoretically caused by the withholding of treatment, not the provision of treatment.
Greene & Chambers, supra note 58, at 311.
61. Greene & Chambers, supra note 58, at 311.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 314.
68. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 103–06.
69. Complaint at 19, City of Fargo v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-00139 (D. N.D. July 9, 2019); Jef Feeley,
Opioid Evangelist Switches Sides in Case Alleging Pharma Abuse, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:56 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-08/opioid-evangelist-switches-sides-in-case-allegingpharma-abuse.
70. Arthur H. Gale, Drug Company Compensated Physicians Role in Causing America’s Deadly Opioid
Epidemic: When Will We Learn?, 113 MO. MED. 244, 244 (2016).
71. Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain:
Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171, 171–86 (1986).
72. Complaint, supra note 59, at 90.
73. Feeley, supra note 69.
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Exposed to this new information on the safety of opioids even for
noncancer pain, in conjunction with the new policy emphasis on relieving pain,
providers understandably responded by prescribing more opioids.74 While there
are legitimate reasons to be sensitive to populations with truly undertreated
pain,75 the misinformation about the risks associated with opioids propagated by
pharmaceutical companies helped ignite the current crisis. This misinformation
would later become the basis for many of the lawsuits connected with that crisis,
which is reviewed in the next Subpart.
C. CURRENT LITIGATION REFLECTS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESCRIBERPHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY RELATIONSHIP
As the full burden of the opioid crisis became clear, litigation over the
harms associated with increased opioid use exploded. The first wave of that
litigation has culminated in the multidistrict litigation under Judge Polster76 and
the first verdict against Johnson & Johnson in Oklahoma.77 This Subpart engages
with the theories underlying the current litigation and detail why, regardless of
the specific claim, the dynamic between pharmaceutical companies and
prescribers constitutes the heart of current litigation.78
At first glance, the most natural target of lawsuits filed by patients who
become addicted to opioids would appear to be the healthcare providers who
prescribed them. Providers have faced several lawsuits in connection with the
opioid crisis. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court recently addressed
whether wrongful conduct of opioid addicts served as a complete bar to recovery
against physicians for negligent over-prescription.79 It held that patients could
hold prescribers liable for their addiction even if those patients engaged in illegal
activity—such as consuming heroin or other illicit opioids—in addition to the
prescription opioids furnished by the providers.80 Similarly, major drugstore
chains have sued unnamed physicians, claiming that prescribers should pay
some of the potential penalty levied against drugstores based on their overprescription.81 While it would come as no surprise to see more claims filed
against providers in the future, the bulk of the opioid litigation has focused on

74. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 347–48.
75. We do not mean to suggest that opioids should never be prescribed or that the unavailability of opioids
negatively impacts some patients. We only mean to suggest that, consistent with existing research, opioids have
been overprescribed in the aggregate.
76. In re Nat’l Prescription Opioid Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
77. Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.html.
78. Of course, current litigation also involves distributors and pharmacies accused of similar conduct, but
we focus on pharmaceutical manufacturers.
79. Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo Cnty., 773 S.E.2d 627, 630 (W.Va. 2015).
80. Id. at 635–36.
81. Lenny Bernstein, Major Drugstore Chains Sue Doctors in Sprawling Federal Opioid Case, WASH.
POST (Jan. 8, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/major-drugstore-chains-sue-doctors-insprawling-federal-opioid-case/2020/01/07/3ac9cd70-317d-11ea-9313-6cba89b1b9fb_story.html.
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pharmaceutical companies.82 Accordingly, this Subpart focuses on claims filed
against these defendants.
Litigation in connection with the opioid crisis has been ongoing since the
early 2000s,83 but this litigation has accelerated in the past few years. This
Subpart concentrates on the most prominent current litigation—the multidistrict
litigation (MDL) focused on holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for
all the harms precipitated by the crisis. In general, these complaints assert
numerous claims that pharmaceutical companies are responsible for the opioid
crisis.84 The heart of the complaints center on two general patterns of behavior.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors either (1) engaged in misleading
or fraudulent advertising or (2) failed to monitor supply chains of controlled
substances.85 This Subpart explains why both patterns inherently implicate the
prescriber-pharmaceutical relationship.
1. False and Misleading Advertising
Many of the MDL complaints allege that pharmaceutical companies
engaged in false and misleading advertisement, which led to physicians
overprescribing opioids. This situation usually occurs in at least two ways. First,
plaintiffs have alleged that pharmaceutical companies relayed false information
to physicians.86 Second, and more nefariously, plaintiffs allege that
pharmaceutical companies have used physicians to create new, misleading
scientific information about the appropriateness of opioid use.87
Concerning the relaying of existing false information, plaintiffs have
accused pharmaceutical companies of offering information to physicians that
systematically overvalues the benefits and undervalues the risks associated with
opioids. Plaintiffs specifically accuse pharmaceutical companies of

82. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2019 WL 3917575, at *11–15
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2019).
83. Rebecca Haffajee and Michelle Mello summarize the high-profile government and class action
settlements from 2004 to 2017. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for the
Opioid Epidemic, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2301–02 (2017).
84. Frequently brought claims include: (1) public nuisance—see, for example, Complaint, supra note 59,
at 270; Complaint at 1, 4, Wayne Cnty. Comm’n v. Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc., No. 17-01962 (S.D. W. Va. Mar.
21, 2017) [hereinafter, Complaint, Wayne Cnty. Comm’n]; (2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”) violations—see, for example, Complaint, supra note 59, at 234; (3) state consumer protections
acts claims—see, for example, id. at 268; (4) negligence claims—see, for example, id. at 272–77; (5) fraud
claims—see, for example, Complaint at 96, 115, 119, City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14-04361
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. June 2, 2014) [hereinafter Complaint, City of Chicago]; and (6) unjust enrichment claims—
see, for example, id. at 120; Complaint, supra note 59, at 277. While the City of Chicago is no longer part of the
MDL, City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P. is informative of the relevant allegations.
85. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 39, 134; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 15;
Complaint at 38, 132, City of Daytona Beach v. Purdue, No. 19-01103 (M.D. Fla. June 13, 2019).
86. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 39; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 15; Complaint,
supra note 85, at 38.
87. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 69, at 9–10.
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misrepresenting (1) the low addiction risk associated with chronic opioid use,88
(2) the ease with which addiction can be detected and addressed,89 (3) the risks
associated with alternative forms of pain relief,90 (4) the specific efficacy of
particular opioids,91 and (5) the risks associated with increasing opioid doses.92
These misrepresentations were intended to “create a series of misperceptions in
the medical community.”93
Concerning the creation of new misleading information, plaintiffs have
alleged that pharmaceutical companies perpetuated misleading information by
using physicians to create novel, but inaccurate, material about the
appropriateness of opioid use, effectively contaminating the existing body of
scientific evidence.94 Pharmaceutical companies are accused of paying
physicians that they considered to be “key opinion leaders” to not only present
lectures at continuing medical education (CME) events but to develop treatment
guidelines that recommend the increased use of opioids.95 While Russell
Portenoy is one of the best known “leaders” recruited by pharmaceutical
companies, many other physicians engaged in similar behavior according to
plaintiffs.96
The provision of existing misleading information and the creation of new
misinformation certainly implicates the relationship between pharmaceutical
companies and physicians. While this relationship need not always involve the
exchange of misleading information, a stronger bond between pharmaceutical
companies and prescribers may facilitate the exchange of damaging information
or strengthen the effect of this information on prescribers. Accordingly,
understanding the nature and extent of this relationship is paramount in the
ongoing litigation.
2. Failure to Monitor Supply Chains
The second pattern of behavior alleged by plaintiffs involves the failure of
manufacturers and distributors to monitor opioid supply chains.97 Under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), manufacturers and distributors have a
statutory duty to design and operate a system to identify suspicious orders of
controlled substances and notify the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

88. Complaint, supra note 59, at 39; Complaint, supra note 69, at 9–10; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra
note 84, at 23–27.
89. Complaint, supra note 59, at 53.
90. Id. at 67; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 42.
91. Complaint, supra note 59, at 70.
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. at 38.
94. Complaint, supra note 69, at 10.
95. Complaint, supra note 59, at 85; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 53–59.
96. Complaint, supra note 59, at 106–12 (listing other key opinion leaders).
97. Complaint at 21, Logan Cnty. Comm’n v. Cardinal Health, No. 17-02296 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 11, 2017);
Complaint, supra note 59, at 134; Complaint, Wayne Cnty. Comm’n, supra note 84, at 4.
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upon the discovery of such an order.98 The accompanying regulations define as
“suspicious” orders of “unusual size, orders deviating substantially from a
normal pattern, and orders of unusual frequency.”99 Prior to the current
litigation, the extent of this duty to monitor the supply chains remained an open
question. Recently, however, the district court handling the MDL determined
that the law imposes a duty both to identify and report suspicious orders and not
to ship such orders.100
In particular, the complaints allege that manufacturers and distributors had
a duty, in connection with their general duty to monitor, to notice when
physicians excessively prescribed opioids.101 Indeed, in In re National
Prescription Opiate Litigation, the court noted that the DEA explicitly stated
that “a distributor may not simply rely on the fact that the person placing the
suspicious order is a DEA registrant and turn a blind eye to the suspicious
circumstances.”102 Accordingly, while physicians retain professional judgment
in how they prescribe, manufacturers and distributors have an independent duty
to report suspicious orders. Moreover, the plaintiffs have argued that not only
did manufacturers fail to recognize these suspicious orders—a form of
diversion,103 according to complaints—manufacturers used their knowledge of
which physicians were prescribing unusually large quantities of opioids to target
these physicians for even more advertisements.104
Overall, even the allegations concerning pharmaceutical companies’
failure to monitor supply chains rest (at least in some cases) on the relationships
between these companies and the prescribers of their products. In light of the
importance of the prescriber-pharmaceutical company relationship to the current
litigation, understanding the current state of this relationship is critical.

98. In particular, a registered entity has a duty to (1) “design and operate a system to identify suspicious
orders” for itself, (2) “ensure that the system designed and operated . . . complies with applicable Federal and
State privacy laws,” and (3) notify the DEA upon discovery of a suspicious order. 21 U.S.C. § 832(a) (2018).
99. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b) (2020).
100. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2019 WL 3917575, at *7–9 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
19, 2019). This independent legal duty seems to provide the basis for public nuisance and RICO claims. See
Complaint, supra note 69, at 143. Of course, this does not mean that other district courts will agree.
101. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 134; Complaint, supra note 85, at 132.
102. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2019 WL 3917575, at *5.
103. The DEA describes “diversion” as “the redirection of controlled substances which may have lawful
uses into illicit channels,” Controlled Substances Quotas, 83 Fed. Reg. 32784, 32784 (July 16, 2018) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1303), and this term encompasses a wide variety of actions. Some complaints have
alleged diversion as the actual theft from pharmacies or legitimate patients or the unauthorized use of a legitimate
prescription by family members, see Complaint, supra note 85, at 154.
104. Complaint, supra note 85, at 156 (alleging that the “manufacturers were keenly aware of the doctors
who were writing large quantities of opioids. But instead of investigating or reporting those doctors, Defendants
were singularly focused on maintaining, capturing, or increasing their sales”).
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II. THE CONTINUING CONNECTION BETWEEN PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES AND PRESCRIBERS
Considering past egregious conduct and the ongoing litigation, this Article
focuses its empirical exercise on the current relationship between
pharmaceutical companies and providers, as measured by legal, non-researchrelated payments. Purely illegal transactions—the kind that tend to receive the
most attention in plaintiffs’ complaints—are essentially unobservable. However,
the connection between legal pharmaceutical payments and physician
prescription patterns can serve as a proxy for the strength of the relationship
between companies and prescribers.
This Subpart provides the theoretical backbone on which the empirical
analysis of the relationship between pharmaceutical payments and opioid
prescription rates is built. It introduces two potential roles that pharmaceutical
promotion to providers may play: a legitimately educational one and a
persuasive one. It then distills these potential roles into clear hypotheses that will
be tested in the empirical analysis. Although this analysis does not purport to
establish any basis of liability for pharmaceutical companies, examining the
legal payments from manufacturers to prescribers can provide important and
relevant insight into the relationships that underlie allegations of liability in
general. Understanding these relationships can also provide insight into legal,
but troubling, connections between pharmaceutical companies and prescribers.
A. THE THEORETICAL MECHANISMS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INFLUENCE
For obvious reasons, pharmaceutical companies do not publicize illegal
activities or activities which may subject them to liability. Accordingly, this
Article examines the prescriber-manufacturer relationship in the context of
documented (and legal) non-research-related payments to physicians from
pharmaceutical companies. In order to draw viable (and precise) conclusions
from this type of data, certain assumptions underlying this approach are
addressed.
(1) Legal, non-research-related payments both represent a legal
exchange and serve as a proxy for a pharmaceutical representative’s
opportunity to spread information.
This is the critical assumption for the following empirical exercise. The
observable, legal payments serve not only as a measure of money received by
physicians from pharmaceutical companies but also as a useful proxy for
pharmaceutical promotion that provides opportunities to inform physicians
about the safety and efficacy of a given drug.
While this exercise assumes very little about the effect of documented
payments and underlying activity, this analysis requires the following
assumption:
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(2) The amount of money exchanged is positively correlated with
information exchanged.
This argument is justified in one of two ways: (1) more money is correlated
with more time to exchange information about the drug, and (2) more money is
correlated with higher quality time to exchange information about the drug. In
the first sense, more money spent on food and drink is correlated with a higher
quantity of promotional visits. In the second sense, more money is spent on a
higher quality of visit in the form of higher quality goods and services.
Accordingly, the observable payments are proxies for pharmaceutical contact.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to observe what transpires during such
contact, particularly the informational content. Therefore, the type of
informational content that is exchanged is separated into two categories:
“legitimately educational” and “persuasive.”105
(3) “Legitimately educational” information reflects purely unbiased
assessments of opioid risk and benefits.
If pharmaceutical representatives engage in “legitimately educational”
promotion, they would merely communicate unbiased information about the
safety and efficacy of opioids. Such unbiased information would have to include
accurate representations of both the benefits and risks of opioids. An accurate
representation of the benefits without an accurate representation of the risks
cannot qualify as legitimately educational. No legitimate educational functions
of payments from pharmaceutical companies to prescribers should raise red flags
or serve as the basis for any liability in the current litigation.
Notably, if the notion that pharmaceutical representatives engage in
legitimately educational promotion is believed, recorded payments must be
interpreted only as opportunities to present such unbiased education. If
interpreted as having independent persuasive value, pharmaceutical
representatives would no longer be solely offering legitimately educational
conduct.
(4) Information that does not qualify as “legitimately educational” is
“persuasive.”
Persuasive information exchanged by pharmaceutical representatives
encompasses several degrees of misleading information. Persuasive information
could merely be the accurate representation of the benefits of opioids without an
accurate representation of the risks. It could also include an overoptimistic
representation of benefits and risks. Importantly, persuasive information also
encompasses entirely false and fraudulent information about risks and benefits.
105. These categories are undoubtedly difficult to differentiate in practice. However, we find this theoretical
dichotomy useful, as each provides a clear empirical prediction. The empirical reality will be more mixed, but
our average effects will indicate with which type of payment our results are most consistent.
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Historically, this type of behavior has led to increased opioid prescription
rates,106 and the continued existence of a strong and positive relationship
between opioid-related payments and opioid-prescribing rates deep into the
opioid crisis may be cause for continued concern. Indeed, this is one of the
central allegations in many of the ongoing suits against opioid manufacturers.107
In contrast to a legitimately educational promotion, under a persuasive
paradigm, monetary values have a potentially independent effect on opioid
prescription rates. That is, while payments could be merely an opportunity for
pharmaceutical representatives to persuade physicians, they may also function
as independent incentives to prescribe more opioids or reward already-highprescribing physicians. This leads to a subtle, but important, caveat.
(5) This study does not distinguish between the use of payments to
incentivize physicians to prescribe more and the use of payments to
reward high-prescribing physicians.
On one hand, manufacturers may encourage physicians to prescribe more
opioids by providing incentives in the form of dinners or conferences. On the
other hand, the positive association between opioid detailing and prescribing
rates may represent less of an incentive-based scheme and more of a reward
structure. For example, instead of targeting physicians that may respond to
financial incentives or additional education materials, manufacturers may offer
something akin to a reward for already high-prescribing physicians. Though not
illegal in and of themselves, payments that serve these functions are consistent
with various plaintiffs’ lawsuits—pharmaceutical companies established
relationships with physicians that ultimately led to higher prescription rates.
With these caveats in mind, this Subpart turns to the hypotheses generated
from this theoretical model. The empirical analysis searches for evidence of a
relationship between opioid-related payments by manufacturers and opioidprescribing rates by providers. Distinguishing between educational and
incentivizing functions is not simple. The different functions of pharmaceutical
payments, however, should be associated with different effects on opioidprescribing rates among providers receiving payments.
If payments serve legitimately educational purposes, then higher levels of
payments should only be correlated with more/better education. It is not clear
that better education should be correlated with higher levels of prescribing. In
some cases, better education may result in more opioids prescribed to patients
who need them, but in others, more education may dissuade providers from
inappropriately prescribing opioids. Indeed, as the 2016 guidelines on opioid

106. See supra Part I.B.
107. See supra Part I.C.
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prescribing issued by the CDC demonstrate, a better understanding of how to
prescribe opioids can often lead to lower prescription rates.108
This is not to say that a positive correlation between payments and
prescriptions is always inconsistent with legitimate education. If legitimately
educational information was targeted mostly to physicians who should be
prescribing high levels of opioids (perhaps due to the type of patients they treat),
a mechanical correlation between payments and prescriptions might emerge.
This would require a very targeted knowledge—not of physician prescription
habits, but of the needs of the underlying population the physician serves.
On the other hand, if payments serve primarily to encourage or reward
higher prescribing rates, then a straightforward correlation should emerge: the
receipt of more payments from pharmaceutical companies should be associated
with higher opioid prescription rates.
Hypothesis 1a: If there is no significant correlation between
pharmaceutical payments and physician prescription, payments do not
serve a persuasive function.
Hypothesis 1b: If there is a significantly positive correlation between
pharmaceutical payments and physician prescription, payments serve
either a (1) persuasive function or (2) legitimately educational
function directed only to physicians who should be high-volume opioid
prescribers.
By themselves, these hypotheses 1a–1b do not adequately distinguish
between a legitimately educational and persuasive function of pharmaceutical
payments. Accordingly, to gain better insight into the role of payments from
pharmaceutical companies to physicians, changes in state informational laws
must be used. As detailed in the next Subpart, these state laws provide the
analytical leverage needed to explore more fully the role of payments on opioid
prescription rates.
B. CHANGES IN STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM LAWS
Given the severity of the opioid crisis, potential plaintiffs have not been
alone in taking action. Policymakers and other stakeholders have come to
appreciate the severity of the ongoing epidemic. They have proposed a number
of legal, policy, and clinical interventions to forestall the deepening of the crisis.
An exhaustive review of these efforts is well beyond the scope of this Article
but understanding policies that may play a role in the prescriber-manufacturer
relationship provides important context for this empirical analysis.
Although the federal government has taken some steps to mitigate the
opioid crisis,109 states have initiated most policies aimed at this crisis. The most
108. Deborah Dowell, Tamara M. Haegerich & Roger Chou, CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for
Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1–15 (2016).
109. The federal government has passed several funding initiatives aimed at ameliorating the opioid
epidemic. In 2016, the CDC issued a guideline on prescribing opioids for chronic pain. Id. at 1. This guideline
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popular policy option to date has been the use of prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs).110 When implementing these programs, state governments
establish a central repository of information on the prescription medications
prescribed to individual patients and give providers access to this database.111
State governments design these programs “to facilitate detection of suspicious
prescribing and utilization.”112 The first PDMPs were created in the early 1900s,
but modern PDMPs did not emerge until the late 20th and early 21st centuries.113
These programs employ electronic data transmission to capture information on
prescriptions and quickly disseminate that data to relevant stakeholders.114 Early
programs offered only clumsy access to providers or were limited to law
enforcement, but later adopting states designed their programs with providers in
mind.115 However, even when providers could access the information contained
in PDMPs relatively easily, they often declined to do so: administrative data
suggests that only a small proportion of providers chose to obtain patient
prescription histories from state PDMPs.116 Empirical evidence on these types
of PDMPs demonstrates that, consistent with few providers accessing them,
these programs had little impact on opioid prescriptions.117
was “intended to . . . improve the safety and effectiveness of pain treatment, and reduce the risks associated with
long-term opioid therapy, including opioid use disorder, overdose, and death.” Id. Evaluating the effectiveness
of a national policy of this type is more difficult than evaluating state policies, but several years after the issuance
of the CDC’s guideline, the opioid crisis did begin to abate. Hedegaard, supra note 1, at 1.
110. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Colleen Carey, The Effect of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
on Opioid Utilization in Medicare, 10 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 77, 77 (2018) (noting that “nearly every state
has implemented a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program”).
111. Id. at 77–78.
112. Id. at 77.
113. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., HISTORY OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS 3–7 (2018), https://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_admin/
TAG_History_PDMPs_final_20180314.pdf.
114. See id. at 5 (“Taking advantage of emerging technology, Oklahoma (1990), broke the mold of previous
PDMPs with its landmark legislation requiring electronic transmission of prescription data from a pharmacy
directly to the state.”).
115. Id. (discussing the evolution of state PDMPs).
116. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM CTR. OF EXCELLENCE AT BRANDEIS, MANDATING PDMP
PARTICIPATION BY MEDICAL PROVIDERS: CURRENT STATUS AND EXPERIENCE IN SELECTED STATES 2 (2014),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/247134.pdf.
117. Ellen Meara, Jill R. Horwitz, Wilson Powell, Lynn McClelland, Weiping Zhou, A. James O’Malley &
Nancy E. Morden, State Legal Restrictions and Prescription-Opioid Use Among Disabled Adults, 375 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 44, 50–52 (2016); Leonard J. Paulozz, Edwin M. Kilbourne & Hema A. Desai, Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs and Death Rates from Drug Overdose, 12 PAIN MED. 747, 750–52 (2011); Anupam B.
Jena, Dana Goldman, Lesley Weaver & Pinar Karaca-Mandic, Opioid Prescribing by Multiple Providers in
Medicare: Retrospective Observational Study of Insurance Claims, 348 BRITISH MED. J. 1, 4–5 (2014); Guohua
Li, Joanne E. Brady, Barbara H. Lang, James Giglio, Hannah Wunsch & Charles DiMaggio, Prescription Drug
Monitoring and Drug Overdose Mortality, 1 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 5–6 (2014); Joanne E. Brady, Hannah
Wunsch, Charles DiMaggio, Barbara H. Lang, James Giglio & Guohua Li, Prescription Drug Monitoring and
Dispensing of Prescription Opioids, 129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 139, 142–44 (2014); Tamara M. Haegerich, Leonard
J. Paulozzi, Brian J. Manns & Christopher M. Jones, What We Know, and Don’t Know, About the Impact of
State Policy and Systems-Level Interventions on Prescription Drug Overdose, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 34, 47–48 (2014). But see Liza M. Reifler, Danna Droz, J. Elise Bailey, Sidney H. Schnoll,
Reginald Fant, Richard C. Dart & Becki Bucher Bartelson, Do Prescription Monitoring Programs Impact State
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The current evolution of state PDMPs addressed the problem of providers
not accessing patients’ prescription information.118 Currently, “[a]ll PDMPs
allow access to their data by prescribers and dispensers.”119 And the vast
majority of state programs now require providers to query prescription
information before writing or dispensing a new prescription to a patient.120 This
mandatory-access nature of PDMPs is relatively recent—only five states had
mandated accessing a PDMP prior to prescribing in 2010—and is specifically
designed to address the problem of providers not having relevant patient history
before writing a new prescription.121 Research specific to these mandatory
PDMPs has revealed consistent evidence that they effectively reduce opioid
prescriptions.
For example, Thomas Buchmueller and Colleen Carey examined a series
of opioid misuse measures to determine the impact of mandatory PDMPs on
patterns of opioid use. They found that “‘must access’ PDMPs reduce . . . the
percentage of Medicare . . . enrollees who obtain prescriptions from five or more
prescribers . . . by 8 percent and the percentage of enrollees who obtain
prescriptions from five or more pharmacies by more than 15 percent.”122 Their
research also revealed a negative relationship between the presence of a PDMP
and opioid poisoning incidents.123 Similar research has “f[ou]nd evidence that
mandatory PDMP access laws are effective in reducing [prescription] drug
abuse, and in particular opioid abuse.”124 Another study concluded that “[r]obust
PDMPs may be able to significantly reduce opioid dosages dispensed,
percentages of patients receiving opioids, and high-risk prescribing,”125 and
explained that PDMPs are only effective in reducing prescription rates “if they
obligate doctors to check for patient history on the PDMP prior to filling out a

Trends in Opioid Abuse/Misuse?, 13 PAIN MED. 434, 434 (2012) (“Results support an association between PMPs
and mitigated opioid abuse and misuse trends.”).
118. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., supra note 113, at
7 (“Building on the experience and knowledge of earlier programs, more recent PDMPs have been implemented
faster, employing best practices, and breaking new ground themselves in bringing PDMPs to their full
potential.”).
119. Id.
120. Id. (“In 2010, five (5) states (CO, DE, LA, NV and OK) had mandatory query laws, and today 40 states
have such requirements.”).
121. Id.
122. Buchmueller & Carey, supra note 110, at 78–79.
123. Id. at 78–79.
124. Anca M. Grecu, Dhaval M. Dave & Henry Saffer, Mandatory Access Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs and Prescription Drug Abuse, 38 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 181, 183 (2019).
125. Rebecca L. Haffajee, Michelle M. Mello, Fang Zhang, Alan M. Zaslavsky, Marc R. Larochelle & J.
Frank Wharam, Four States with Robust Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduced Opioid Dosages, 37
HEALTH AFFS. 964, 964 (2018).
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prescription.”126 In general, this evidence supports an important role of
mandatory PDMPs in curbing opioid prescriptions and opioid-related harms.127
Recent research has investigated the effect of these programs on payments
from pharmaceutical companies to prescribers by examining in more detail the
role of PDMPs in curbing opioid prescriptions. A team led by Thuy Nguyen
found evidence that mandatory access PDMPs reduce the amount companies
expend in promoting opioids to prescribers.128 The researchers explain that their
“results are consistent with economic theory, predicting lower promotional
activities when return on investment decreases after state prescribing
restrictions.”129 This evidence provides important support for the analysis
conducted in this Article. By showing that PDMPs can impact the payments
received by prescribers from pharmaceutical companies,130 Nguyen’s study
highlights the ability of these laws to modulate the prescriber-manufacturer
relationship. The following analysis takes the next step, investigating the role of
PDMPs in this relationship in greater depth and tying this effect to the ongoing
litigation described above.
As a general matter, PDMPs may impact the prescriber-manufacturer
relationship in several ways. First, and most importantly, PDMPs can correct
misconceptions that physicians have about the undertreatment of pain,
particularly misconceptions perpetuated by pharmaceutical detailing. Indeed,
the purpose of PDMP laws is to provide more information to physicians so that
they prescribe pain treatments more effectively. By providing physicians with
an accurate count of the number of opioids their patients receive, physicians may
better identify where pharmaceutical claims about the need for opioids deviate
from objective evidence for their patients.
Second, PDMP laws may reduce the amount of money pharmaceutical
companies are willing to spend on physicians. Nguyen’s study found that the
adoption of PDMP laws leads to a drop in the amount of pharmaceutical
payments in the state.131 The authors explained that this drop in payments is
consistent with pharmaceutical companies decreasing the amount they are
willing to spend “when the return on investment decreases.”132
126. Ian Ayres & Amen Jalal, The Impact of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on U.S. Opioid
Prescriptions, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 387, 397 (2018).
127. While the existing evidence clearly demonstrates an important role of mandatory PDMPs, recent
research has noted that differences in dataset construction may have led to some differences in results across
studies. Jill Horwitz, Corey S. Davis, Lynn S. McClelland, Rebecca S. Fordon & Ellen Meara, The Problem of
Data Quality in Analyses of Opioid Regulation: The Case of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24947, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24947.
128. Thuy D. Nguyen, W. David Bradford & Kosali I. Simon, How Do Opioid Prescribing Restrictions
Affect Pharmaceutical Promotion? Lessons from the Mandatory Access Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs 23–37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26356, 2019), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w26356/w26356.pdf.
129. Id. at 1.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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Third, PDMPs may increase the cost (in the form of more liability) of
prescribing more opioids from the perspective of providers. With a PDMP in
place, physicians are required to check a patient’s prescription history and may
be charged with constructive notice of this history.133 Accordingly, physicians’
expected liability may increase because it becomes easier to confirm the
occurrence of over-prescription and prove that physicians knowingly
overprescribe opioids.
Given these effects of PDMPs, it is possible to leverage the presence of
these programs to better understand the role of payments to prescribers. If these
payments serve legitimately educational functions, then the presence of a PDMP
should have little impact on the relationship between payments and prescribing
rates. Consistent with the effects described above, PDMPs could certainly lower
prescription rates generally, but this reduction should occur independently of the
relationship between opioid payments and prescribing rates. In other words, an
additional dollar paid to a prescriber in a state with a PDMP should have the
same effect as an additional dollar paid to a prescriber in a state without a PDMP
if these payments represent expenditures on legitimate educational
opportunities.
On the other hand, if pharmaceutical payments primarily serve a persuasive
function, then PDMPs should modulate the effect of these payments on
individual prescribers. If, as described above, PDMPs provide prescribers with
more accurate information on which patients have received relatively large
amounts of opioids, then these programs may correct misconceptions that
patients are not over-prescribed opioids. In correcting these misconceptions,
PDMPs may decrease the positive impact payments from companies have on
opioid prescription rates. Similarly, if, as some research has suggested,
companies find it less worthwhile to pay providers when PDMPs are in place,
then prescribers may change their response to payments from manufacturers in
the presence of a PDMP.134 Finally, as providers become attuned to their liability
in the presence of PDMPs, they may be less willing to respond to the incentives
offered by these programs because of the higher liability costs attached to doing
so.
Overall, the presence of PDMPs should have little impact on the effect of
a payment from a manufacturer to a prescriber if these payments serve legitimate
educational functions. However, if these payments primarily serve a persuasive
function, then PDMPs should decrease the effectiveness of these payments such
that a given payment in a state with a PDMP should increase opioid prescription
rates less than in a state without a PDMP. This provides the second testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on observing a positive correlation between
pharmaceutical payments, if payments serve a persuasive function, the
133. Buchmueller & Carey, supra note 110, at 82–86.
134. Nguyen et al., supra note 128, at 23–37.

850

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:827

implementation of PDMP laws will mitigate the correlation between
payments and prescription rates.

Accordingly, if a significant negative effect of PDMP laws is seen on the
impact of pharmaceutical payments on prescriptions, this provides evidence that
the original pharmaceutical influence is not legitimately educational but rather
persuasive.
Given these clear hypotheses, it is possible to empirically examine the role
of payments from pharmaceutical companies to prescribers. The next Part
describes the data and methodology used to test these hypotheses in detail.

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To examine the prescriber-manufacture relationship in the context of the
ongoing opioid crisis, we conduct a groundbreaking empirical analysis. This
Part begins by outlining the data and methodology used in that analysis.135 The
analysis itself proceeds in two parts. We first examine the prescribermanufacturer relationship generally, testing whether payments from
manufacturers to prescribers are associated with higher opioid-prescribing rates
generally. The second phase of the analysis then examines whether PDMPs
impact this relationship. This two-part analysis allows us to empirically test the
hypotheses laid out in the previous Part.
A. DATA ON THE PRESCRIBER-MANUFACTURER RELATIONSHIP
As no dataset contains information on both opioid prescription rates and
payments to prescribers from pharmaceutical companies, we created one for this
study. We focus on the period of 2013–2017.136 In particular, we synthesized
data during this period from three disparate sources, including the Medicare Part
D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration
System (NPPES), and the Open Payments dataset maintained by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services.137 The Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber
Summary File provides the percent of prescriptions consisting of opioids written
by individual providers to Medicare beneficiaries each year between 2013 and

135. We provide a general discussion of our methodology and, in the interest of clarity and readability,
reserve the more technical details of our analysis to the footnotes.
136. It bears noting that we are using data from the tail end of the opioid crisis; however, this will bias
against finding statistically significant results. In view of the current litigation pressure and scrutiny, we expect
that our estimation of the relationship is an underestimate of the historical relationship that existed at the height
of the opioid crisis.
137. We examine these years because the Open Payments data begins in 2013, and the Medicare Part D data
is only available until 2017 currently. See Dataset Downloads, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Explore-the-Data/Dataset-Downloads (last visited Feb. 25, 2021)
(showing that available data begins with “Complete 2013 Program Year Open Payments Dataset”); Medicare
Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, CMS DATA, https://data.cms.gov/browse?tags=
opioidmap&sortBy=newest (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (filtering to show datasets for 2013 to 2017).
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2017.138 Though this dataset is limited to Medicare beneficiaries, it has been
used in policy evaluations in the past and represents the best available data on
opioid prescriptions that can be obtained without triggering important
confidentiality problems.139 The data in this file come from more granular data
on Medicare patients but are organized in a way to protect the confidentiality of
patients. This dataset identifies individual healthcare providers but does not
provide a precise location. To obtain the location of individual providers, which
is necessary to determine the applicability of various laws, we rely on the NPPES
dataset. After merging these two datasets,140 we have a new dataset that includes
the opioid prescription rates of all providers across the country and the location
of each of these providers.141
To obtain information on the payments made to these providers by
pharmaceutical companies, we rely on the Open Payments dataset maintained
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The Affordable Care Act
required the creation of this dataset to provide greater transparency in the
prescriber-pharmaceutical company relationships.142 Any time a pharmaceutical
or medical device manufacturer “provides a payment or other transfer of value”
to a provider, that manufacturer must report, inter alia, the name of the provider,
the amount of the payment, the date of the payment, and “[a] description of the
nature of the payment or other transfer of value.”143 A dataset containing
information on all such payments must then be made publicly available. We rely
on this “Open Payments” dataset to glean information on legal payments made
by pharmaceutical companies to prescribers.
The Open Payments dataset provides rich information on the number of
payments received by each provider by name and full address. However, not all
of these payments are relevant to opioid prescriptions. Therefore, we filter many
of these payments out of the data. First, we only consider general payments, not
payments associated with research, in order to capture non-research influence
138. Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, supra note 137. Because the Medicare prescription
data reports opioid claims counts between 1 and 10 as missing, we impute any missing values as 5.5. We then
recompute the opioid prescription rate for these providers and impute that for missing values of the opioid
prescription rate. We treat reported zeros as true zeros.
139. Ashley C. Bradford & W. David Bradford, The Impact of Medical Cannabis Legalization on
Prescription Medication Use and Costs under Medicare Part D, 61 J.L. & ECON. 461, 468 (2018).
140. Both the Medicare prescription dataset and NPPES dataset include the national provider identifier
(“NPI”) number of each provider. Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, supra note 137; NPI Files,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://download.cms.gov/nppes/NPI_Files.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2021). We rely on the NPI to accurately match the two datasets.
141. While our sample is limited to Medicare claims, physicians treating Medicare patients also often treat
non-Medicare patients. See Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn & W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of
Cannabis Access Laws on Opioid Prescribing, 69 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 12 (2020) (examining prescribing patterns
that evince physicians treating patients with different types of insurance). Insofar as these treatment patterns are
not wholly distinct, our results can be informative of non-Medicare patients. Even if this were not the case,
however, Medicare patients constitute a politically-important subgroup and the empirical relationship reflects
issues of significant public concern.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h.
143. Id. § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A).
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over providers.144 Second, since we are only interested in the incentive effects
of such payments on opioid prescriptions, we only consider payments relating
to products considered opioids. To ensure that we only examine payments
related to opioids, we use a list of opioid product names maintained by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to classify drugs appearing in the
Open Payments dataset145 as opioids.146 Given the complex structure of the data,
we employ a sophisticated algorithm to filter these observations.147 The result is
a dataset that contains detailed information on the non-research-related
payments each prescriber received from opioid manufacturers between 2013 and
2017.
Matching the Open Payments data to the Medicare prescribing data is not
straightforward,148 and a key innovation of this Article is merging information
on opioid prescription rates from the Medicare dataset to the information on
payments from the Open Payments dataset. Because the structure of the datasets
differs substantially, we implement sophisticated matching algorithms to match
prescription data to pharmaceutical payment data. Though difficult to create and
implement, the result of these sophisticated matching programs is a dataset
containing information on the payments made by pharmaceutical companies to
144. We take all observations as given and do not make any adjustments based on “Change” status.
145. Each year of Open Payments lists a number of drugs, devices, or supplies associated with the payment;
if any of the products are considered opioids, we count the payment as an opioid payment. See About
OpenPayments, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/About/About
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
146. CDC Compilation of Benzodiazepines, Muscle Relaxants, Stimulants, Zolpidem, and Opioid
Analgesics with Oral Morphine Milligram Equivalent Conversion Factors, 2017 Version, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data-files/CDC_Oral_Morphine_Milligram_Equivalents_Sept_2017.xlsx
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021). We do not consider product names associated with buprenorphine, as it treats
addiction to narcotic pain relievers. See Christopher Welsh & Adela Valadez-Meltzer, Buprenorphine: A
(Relatively) New Treatment for Opioid Dependence, 2 PSYCHIATRY 29, 31 (2005).
147. Using the software Python, we construct a set of opioid product names. After extracting the products
associated with each payment, the program checks whether there is any overlap between the extracted product
names and the set of opioid product names. If there is, we count the payment as an opioid-related payment.
148. The inherent difficulty in matching prescription data to Open Payments lies in the fact that Open
Payments data do not include NPI numbers. See Dataset Downloads, supra note 136. Accordingly, we must
match payments to prescriptions using name and office address. This is not a simple issue of merging data, as
random misspellings and inconsistent abbreviations make both names and addresses not uniform. For example,
a physician named “John Smith, 1234 Main St., Tallahassee, FL 32306” in the prescription data may be under
“John M. Smith, 1234 Main Street, Suite 302, Tallahassee, FL 32306” in the Open Payments data. Moreover,
sometimes physicians are associated with multiple addresses or versions of their names in a given dataset. We
address these challenges using a combination of data manipulation techniques and string-analysis algorithms.
Specifically, we aggregate total payments for opioids by unique provider number provided by Open Payments.
(Note that this unique ID number does not correspond to NPI number). While we aggregate total payments for
each physician, we associated this aggregate payment with every address the physician is listed by, so that we
have a higher likelihood of matching them to whatever address they have listed in the prescription data. We
compile all of these payments into a data dictionary. We then use the name and mailing address for each
observation in the prescription data to look up the associated payment in the Open Payments data in two steps.
We first attempt to use name and the first line of the address to find an exact match in the Open Payments data
dictionary. If there is not a perfect match, we look at possible providers in the same state and city as the prescriber
and use fuzzy matching on name and first line of the business mailing address to obtain the relevant payment.
We do the fuzzy matching using a Python package designed for this purpose.
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individual physicians and the opioid prescriptions written by those individual
physicians.
This matched dataset is the subject of our empirical analysis detailed
below. However, to complete all phases of that analysis, we augment the dataset
with several other key pieces of information. First, we construct a variable that
indicates whether a provider practiced in a state with a law mandating that
providers check the state’s PDMP before prescribing controlled substances
(which includes all opioids).149 Second, we construct a variable indicating
whether a state had a law authorizing adults to use medical cannabis in a similar
fashion.150 We include information on cannabis access laws because prior work
has shown that they can have a significant impact on opioid prescription rates.151
Thus, controlling for them will better allow us to isolate the role of payments
from companies to prescribers.
Our final dataset contains information on opioid prescription rates,152
pharmaceutical payments, state PDMP laws, and state cannabis access laws.
This dataset is organized at the level of the individual provider,153 providing us
with comprehensive and highly accurate information on the relationships
between pharmaceutical companies and individual providers. In particular, we
can quantify the following relationships: (1) the effect of pharmaceutical
payments on opioid prescriptions rates, and (2) how state PDMP laws may
mitigate this effect. The following Subpart describes the empirical analysis of
these relationships in detail.

149. Information on the dates of adoption of state PDMPs comes from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy
System. Legal Science, PDMP Reporting and Authorized Use, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS.,
http://pdaps.org/datasets/prescription-monitoring-program-laws-1408223416-1502818373 (last visited Feb. 25,
2021). We downloaded the data on December 11, 2019, and used policies indicated as “must-access.” We round
the policy dates to the nearest year (that is, if date is on or prior to July 1, 1999, the year of enactment is 1999.
If the date is after July 1, 1999, the year of enactment is 2000). The policy variable takes the value of one in the
enactment year and afterwards.
150. We similarly rely on information provided by the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System to determine
which states allowed access to medical cannabis and the dates on which that access began. Legal Science,
Medical Marijuana Laws for Patients, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS., http://pdaps.org/datasets/
medical-marijuana-patient-related-laws-1501600783 (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
151. McMichael et al., supra note 141, at 1.
152. The opioid prescription rate is defined as the number of opioid claims divided by total claims (by
physician), multiplied by 100.
153. During the period analyzed here, only payments to physicians were required to be reported to the Open
Payments dataset. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to physicians in this Article. The laws have since been
changed and future iterations of the Open Payments dataset (beginning in 2022) will include detailed payment
information for other providers, such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants. Law and Policy, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/About/Law-and-Policy (last visited Feb.
25, 2021).
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B. METHODOLOGY
To analyze the connection between pharmaceutical payments and
physician opioid prescription rates, we estimate a series of regression models.154
These models allow us to measure the average effect of pharmaceutical
payments on opioid prescription while controlling for other confounding effects.
In particular, the estimated models net out the effect of time-invariant
differences across states. These differences may include different licensing
requirements or the different approaches of medical boards to the opioid crisis.
These, and many other factors that differ across states lines, may impact opioid
prescription rates. By controlling for these various factors,155 our models allow
us to isolate the effect of payments from manufacturers on opioid prescription
rates.
Our models also control for differences across time. In general, the CDC
has noted that the opioid crisis has followed a clear trend, and controlling for the
various factors within this trend is critical if we are to isolate the role of payments
from other factors. Our models include these types of controls.156 Finally, we
allow for differences in prescription rates by different specialties.157 Controlling
for differences across specialties is important because certain specialties
prescribe more opioids than others for legitimate medical reasons.158 By
controlling for all of these factors, our models can isolate the variation in opioid
prescription rates that is attributable to pharmaceutical payments.159
Turning to the details of the models, the outcome we examine throughout
our analysis is the opioid prescription rate of individual providers. While this
outcome measure is straightforward—we simply examine the percent of
prescriptions written that constitute opioid prescriptions160—measuring
manufacturer payments is less so. In particular, prior research has suggested that
154. Throughout our analysis, we estimate ordinary least squares regression models with the following
general specification: 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝛽 + 𝜕! + 𝛾" + 𝜃# + 𝜀. The dependent variable,
OpioidRate, is the average number of opioids a physician prescribes across all of his or her patients each year.
PaymentCategory is a vector of indicator variables that capture the amount of payments received by individual
physicians. This series of variables is described in more detail below. All of our regression models also include
fixed effects for state (𝛾" ), year (𝜕! ), and specialty (𝜃# ). Standard errors are clustered by state.
155. Specifically, the inclusion of state fixed effects controls for observable and unobservable differences
across states.
156. Specifically, the inclusion of year fixed effects control for linear and non-liner temporal trends in opioid
prescription rates.
157. We use specialty data reported in Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File. Medicare Part D
Opioid Prescriber Summary File, supra note 137.
158. The specialty fixed effects control for differences across specialties.
159. In general, with ordinary lease squares (OLS) regressions, there is always a possibility that an omitted
variable that is correlated with pharmaceutical payments is actually impacting opioid prescriptions. This is
particularly problematic when a causal relationship is being inferred. However, here, we are not interested in
eliciting causality; we are instead interested in how physician prescriptions vary with physician payments.
160. The prescription rate is defined as the number of opioid claims divided by total claims, multiplied by
100. This can be interpreted as the average opioid claims for every 100 claims. While there are potentially other
measures we could use for our dependent variable, since our analysis is physician-centric, not patient-centric,
the rate per 100 claims seems most reflective of physician behavior.
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pharmaceutical payments have a lasting effect on physician prescription
decisions.161 In light of this, we focus not on the amount a physician receives in
a given year, but on the cumulative payments they have received over the years
in our sample.
For example, in 2013, our cumulative payment variable will include
payments from 2013. However, in 2014, the cumulative payment variable will
include payments to a given physician from both 2013 and 2014. This allows us
to differentiate between one-off payments and longer relationships. Using these
cumulative payments, we place prescribers into one of six categories based on
the number of payments they have received. The lowest category includes all
prescribers who received no opioid-related payments. We then classify all
providers who received at least one opioid-related payment from a manufacturer
into five separate, equally-sized categories.162 Physicians with the highest levels
of payments appear in the fifth category, those with the next highest levels of
payments in the fourth category, and so on.
Based on these categories, we create a series of variables that indicate the
category each falls into. These indicator variables capture the relationship
between manufacturer payments and opioid prescription rates. For example, the
variable indicating the highest category captures the effect of being among the
most well-paid providers on opioid prescription rates. The variable indicating
the lowest (positive) category captures the effect of receiving some, but not
substantial, payments. While this approach is somewhat more complex than
simply examining payment rates themselves, it is mathematically preferable
because it avoids imposing any assumptions of strict linearity on the effect of
payments. We expect that the effect of payments on prescriptions will vary by
category, and the nature of this variation will allow us to evaluate the various
hypotheses outlined above.
The methodology described so far underlies the first phase of our analysis
that investigates the general relationship between payments and opioid
prescription rates. We also rely on this methodology in the second phase, but we
augment it using information on PDMPs. We describe this augmentation in
greater detail in connection with the second phase of our analysis.

161. Svetlana N. Beilfuss, Pharmaceutical Opioid Marketing and Physician Prescribing Behavior 19 (Oct.
26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://svetlanabeilfuss.com/uploads/1/2/1/5/121526954/jobmarketpaper_
svetlananbeilfuss.pdf.
162. These categories are defined for each state and year. Thus, a physician whose cumulative payment is
in the highest tier in his state in a given state and year might fall into a different tier in a different state or year.
Because pharmaceutical companies separate markets geographically, allowing for different rankings by state is
important. As there might be differences in yearly spending by pharmaceutical companies (and to account for
the ratcheting effect of using cumulative payments), cumulative payments are only compared to other cumulative
payments in a given year.
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C. RESULTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHARMACEUTICAL
PAYMENTS AND OPIOID PRESCRIPTIONS
We begin our analysis by focusing generally on the relationship between
opioid-related payments by manufacturers and opioid prescription rates. Before
delving into the details of our empirical models, however, Figures 1 and 2
present an overview of the prevalence of opioid prescriptions and opioid
detailing, respectively. These figures are not intended to demonstrate the
correlation between opioid prescription and pharmaceutical payments. Indeed,
since our empirical analysis measures the relationship between opioid
prescription rates and relative payment tiers within states in a given year, the
maps necessarily will not preview our empirical results. Instead, these maps
present some idea of geographical variation in both payments and prescriptions.
Figure 1. Opioid Prescription Rates Across the United States

As such, Figure 1 reports the average opioid-prescribing rate for physicians
in each state across our entire data period. This rate varies from a low of 8.12
opioid prescriptions per 100 prescriptions to a high of 14.46 opioid prescriptions.
Interestingly, the regions with the highest-prescribing providers include the
Southern, Mountain, and Pacific Northwest states—a group of states that often
have little in common with one another. In contrast, states in the Northeast and
Midwest generally have lower opioid-prescribing rates.
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Figure 2. Opioid-Related Payments Across the United States

Figure 2 reports the average opioid-related payment rate in each state
across our entire data period. As with opioid-prescribing rates, physicians in the
southern states and mountain states place higher in the distribution of opioid
payments than physicians in other states. While the correlation between states in
the highest categories of opioid-prescribing rates and opioid payments is not
one-to-one, Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that states receiving more opioid
detailing tend to have higher opioid-prescribing rates.
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Figure 3. Opioid Prescriptions by Opioid-Related Payment Category

Figure 3 presents more detailed information on the relationship between
opioid-related payments and opioid-prescribing rates. In particular, it reports the
mean opioid-prescribing rate of physicians who received different amounts of
opioid-related payments from pharmaceutical companies. At the lowest end of
the payment spectrum are those physicians who received no opioid payments
(highlighted in red). These physicians also, on average, had the lowest opioidprescribing rates. Among the physicians who received some amount of opioidrelated payments, Figure 3 divides those physicians into five categories, as
described above. Physicians in the first category received the least amount of
money, while those in the fifth received the highest amount. As Figure 3
illustrates, the mean opioid-prescribing rate generally increases across the
categories. In other words, the more opioid-related payments received by a
physician, the more opioids that physician prescribed.
To explore the relationship between opioid payments and prescribing rates
further, we estimate a series of regression models. In the interest of succinctness,
we report the results graphically. Figure 4163 reports the results of a model
exploring the general relationship between payment levels and prescription
rates. The horizontal axis reports the level of payments received by each
physician. At the lowest level are those physicians who received no payments
from opioid manufacturers. Physicians who received some amount of money
163. The vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals, though these coefficients are all significant at the
5% significance levels as well.
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from opioid manufacturers are, as before, divided into five categories. The
vertical axis tracks the change in physicians’ opioid-prescribing rates associated
with being in a particular payment category.
Figure 4. Effect of Pharmaceutical Payment on Opioid Prescription Rate

Figure 4 demonstrates an increasing relationship between receiving
payments from opioid manufacturers and opioid prescriptions rates. Physicians
that received no payments from opioid companies serve as the baseline.164 Each
successive category is associated with a higher opioid prescription rate relative
to this baseline. However, much of the effect of opioid detailing is concentrated
in the fourth and fifth categories. For example, the first payment category is
associated with approximately 0.2 additional opioid prescriptions per 100
prescriptions than the no-payment baseline. However, the fourth category is
associated with two additional opioid prescriptions per 100 prescriptions. The
fifth payment category is associated with over ten additional opioid prescriptions
per 100 prescriptions than the no-payment baseline.
While the associations reported in Figure 4 do not necessarily represent the
causal effect of opioid-related payments on opioid-prescribing rates, these
164. This is not to suggest that physicians that receive no payments do not prescribe opioids. They do. The
rate at which these physicians prescribe opioids simply serves as the basis of comparison. Each reported effect
for the separate payment quintiles represents the change in opioid-prescribing rates relative to physicians who
received no payments.

860

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:827

results provide important insight into the hypotheses outlined above. In general,
we find no evidence that payments are unrelated to prescribing rates. Instead,
we find consistent evidence that the more money prescribers receive from opioid
manufacturers, the more opioids they prescribe. This relationship is not linear,
and physicians in the highest payment category are much more affected by
payments than are physicians in the lowest category. Indeed, the increase of ten
opioid prescriptions per 100 prescriptions observed in connection with the
highest payment category represents an approximately ninety percent increase
from the baseline physicians who received no opioid-related payments.165
These results provide clear support for Hypothesis 1b—the hypothesis that
higher opioid-related payments are associated with higher opioid-prescription
rates. In other words, the results reveal a consistent positive relationship between
payments and prescribing rates. As noted before, this positive relationship does
not, by itself, demonstrate that opioid-related payments serve a persuasive
purpose. The positive correlation may be an artifact of purely educational
payments as long as those payments are concentrated only on physicians who
should be prescribing high levels of opioids. There are potential reasons for this
to be the case—pharmaceutical representatives may have useful information
about the type of patient populations each physician serves. If representatives
target only physicians whose patients need opioids for unbiased education, the
positive relationship observed here could arise absent any kind of deleterious
behavior on the part of opioid manufacturers. Of course, as noted in Hypothesis
1b, this positive relationship is also consistent with pharmaceutical payments
performing a persuasive role in physician treatment. To discern between these
two functions, we extend our analysis to examine the role of PDMPs. The next
Subpart discusses that extended analysis.
D. RESULTS FOR THE ROLE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS
We focus on the role of PDMPs in mitigating the payment-prescribing
relationship revealed by the results above. PDMPs were originally designed to
provide prescribers with more information about medications patients had
previously received.166 For example, a physician may decline to prescribe
opioids if she has credible information that the patient requesting the
prescription has already received three other opioid prescriptions from other
physicians. In accomplishing this primary purpose, however, PDMPs can also
(if unintentionally) affect the ability of opioid manufacturers to influence
physician prescription patterns.
If physicians are generally unaware of how prevalent opioid prescription
is, the enactment of a PDMP law may reduce prescription rates generally across
all tiers of payments. However, if opioid-related payments serve legitimate
165. As indicated in Figure 2, the baseline group of physicians prescribed approximately eleven opioids per
100 prescriptions.
166. Buchmueller & Carey, supra note 110, at 82–86.
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educational functions, then the presence of a PDMP should have no impact on
the relationship between payments and prescribing rates. In this state of the
world, manufacturers are not using payments to incentivize over-prescription
and are instead disseminating unbiased information about opioid risk and
benefits. As such, the informational value that PDMPs add should not cause
physicians receiving pharmaceutical payments (“education”) to revise their
prescription decisions relative to physicians who do not receive payments.
Accordingly, there should be no mitigating effect on the relationship between
pharmaceutical payments and prescriptions.
On the other hand, if opioid-related payments serve persuasive functions—
persuasion which may involve false or misleading advertising—then PDMPs
should have a clear effect on the relationship between payments and prescribing
rates. In this state of the world, a physician who has received credible
information from a PDMP about a patient may be less likely to believe
manufacturers’ claims about the low risk of addiction associated with chronic
opioid use or claims about the undertreatment of pain.167 Similarly, PDMPs have
the potential to expose physicians who prescribe excessively to unwanted
attention and even liability. If this is the case, then the additional prescriptions
associated with a payment category in states with PDMPs should be smaller than
those in states without these programs. In other words, being in the same
category of payment in a state with a PDMP should induce a smaller uptick in
opioid prescriptions than in a state without a PDMP. Based on Hypothesis 2, we
would then expect that the existence of a PDMP law will mitigate the
relationship between pharmaceutical payments and prescriptions.
Accordingly, by examining the impact of PDMPs on the relationship
between payments and prescription rates, it is possible to understand the nature
of these payments better: do they further legitimate goals, or do they simply
incentivize more prescriptions? To formally test the impact of PDMPs, we
estimate the same regression model that underlies Figure 4, above. Now,
however, we include a variable that indicates whether a prescriber practiced in
a state that maintained a mandatory-access PDMP. We interact this variable with
all of the variables indicating which payment category a physician fell into.168
By doing so, we can estimate the effect of payments on providers who must
access a PDMP relative to those that do not have to access a PDMP under state
law.
Like Figure 4, Figure 5 graphically reports the changes in prescriptions by
pharmaceutical payment category, relative to physicians receiving no payment.
Unlike Figure 4, Figure 5 allows this effect to differ between states and years in
167. For a discussion of the allegations made by plaintiffs in connection with these alleged false
advertisements, see supra Part I.C.
168. Specifically, we estimated the following model: 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦′𝛽 + 𝛼𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑃 +
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑥𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑃′𝛿 + 𝜕! + 𝛾" + 𝜃# + 𝜀, with fixed effects for state (𝛾" ), year (𝜕! ), and specialty (𝜃# ).
Standard errors are clustered by state. For category i, the plotted treatment effect for the non-PDMP line is 𝛽$ ,
while the plotted effect for the PDMP line is 𝛽$ + 𝛿$ . The vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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which a PDMP law is in effect and those in which no PDMP is in effect. If
PDMP laws disrupt the existing relationship between pharmaceutical payments
and prescriptions, the PDMP line should be significantly lower than the nonPDMP line. Figure 5 indicates that the effect of pharmaceutical payment level is
smaller when a PDMP is in place. This effect is statistically significant for all
categories except for the second.169 Thus, not only are PDMP laws generally
associated with fewer opioid prescriptions, the reduction is concentrated in
physicians receiving pharmaceutical payments. Furthermore, the effect becomes
more pronounced in the higher categories of payments, with physicians in the
fifth category seeing a bigger effect on the payment-prescription rate
relationship than those in lower categories.
Figure 5. Effect of Pharmaceutical Payment
on Opioid Prescription Rate, by PDMP Status

In general, the results reported in Figure 5 demonstrate that PDMPs
significantly impact the relationship between payments and prescription rates in
ways that do not support a legitimately educational function for opioid-related
payments. Stated differently, the results provide support for Hypothesis 2. While
the results do not clearly indicate the mechanism by which PDMPs have their
effect, any effect is consistent with payments serving a persuasive role.

169. The difference in effect is significant at the 10% level for the first, third, fourth, and fifth categories.
The difference in effect is also significant at the 5% significance level for the first, fourth, and fifth categories.
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Before exploring the implications of this critically important result, we first
test its robustness. In particular, we re-estimate the same model reported in
Figure 5 but include additional controls for medical cannabis access laws. One
relevant set of policies that have proven effective at addressing the harms
associated with the opioid crisis has been cannabis access laws, even though
these laws were never designed to do so. States that have loosened restrictions
on access to cannabis, either through laws legalizing medical cannabis or
providing access to cannabis for personal or recreational use, have seen
reductions in both opioid use and opioid-related harms.170 Cannabis access laws
accomplish these reductions via a different mechanism than PDMPs, however.
Where PDMPs provide prescribers additional information to combat drugseeking behavior and reduce inappropriate opioid prescriptions, laws facilitating
access to cannabis do so by decreasing the demand for opioids as individuals
substitute cannabis for opioids.171
Insofar as medical cannabis is a substitute for opioid in terms of pain
management,172 the enactment of laws that allow for legal consumption of
170. McMichael et al., supra note 141, at 10; Marcus A. Bachhuber, Brendan Saloner, Chinazo O.
Cunningham & Colleen L. Barry, Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose Mortality in the
United States, 1999–2010, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668, 1671 (2014).
171. See James M. Corroon Jr., Laurie K. Mischley & Michelle Sexton, Cannabis as a Substitute for
Prescription Drugs—A Cross-Sectional Study, 10 J. PAIN RSCH. 989, 989 (2017) (finding that nearly 50% of
patients substitute cannabis for prescription drugs and that the most commonly substituted drugs are prescription
opioids); Michelle Sexton, Carrie Cutler, John S. Finnell & Laurie K. Mischley, A Cross-Sectional Survey of
Medical Cannabis Users: Patterns of Use and Perceived Efficacy, 1 CANNABIS & CANNABINOID RSCH. 131, 133
(2016) (“In response to the question ‘Have you have ever used cannabis as a substitute for prescription drugs?’
59.8% of participants responded yes. When asked which drugs they substitute Cannabis for, over 25% of these
participants reported substituting Cannabis for pain medications, including opiates.”); Kevin F. Boehnke,
Evangelos Litinas & Daniel J. Clauw, Medical Cannabis Use Is Associated with Decreased Opiate Medication
Use in a Retrospective Cross-Sectional Survey of Patients with Chronic Pain, 17 J. PAIN 739, 739 (2016)
(“Among study participants, medical cannabis use was associated with a 64% decrease in opioid use.”); Amanda
Reiman, Mark Welty & Perry Solomon, Cannabis as a Substitute for Opioid-Based Pain Medication: Patient
Self-Report, 2 CANNABIS & CANNABINOID RSCH. 160, 162–64 (2017) (“Ninety-two percent of the sample
‘strongly agreed/agreed’ that they prefer cannabis to opioids for the treatment of their condition and 93%
‘strongly agreed/agreed’ that they would be more likely to choose cannabis to treat their condition if it were
more readily available.”).
172. For example, early work demonstrated that medical cannabis laws reduced the use of prescription drugs
for which cannabis can serve as a substitute among Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. Ashley C. Bradford
& W. David Bradford, Medical Marijuana Laws Reduce Prescription Medication Use in Medicare Part D, 35
HEALTH AFFS. 1230, 1233–35 (2016); Ashley C. Bradford & W. David Bradford, Medical Marijuana Laws May
Be Associated with a Decline in the Number of Prescriptions for Medicaid Enrollees, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 945,
948–50 (2017). Later work, which focused more explicitly on opioids, yielded evidence that medical cannabis
access laws reduce opioid prescriptions among Medicare beneficiaries by between 8% and 21% across six
different types of opioids. Bradford & Bradford, supra note 139, at 476–82. Similarly, medical cannabis access
laws and adult use cannabis access laws reduced opioid prescriptions among Medicaid beneficiaries by 5.88%
and 6.38%, respectively. Hefei Wen & Jason M. Hockenberry, Association of Medical and Adult-Use Marijuana
Laws with Opioid Prescribing for Medicaid Enrollees, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 673, 673 (2018); see also Di
Liang, Yuhua Bao, Mark Wallace, Igor Grant & Yuyan Shi, Medical Cannabis Legalization and Opioid
Prescriptions: Evidence on US Medicaid Enrollees During 1993–2014, 113 ADDICTION 2060, 2063–68 (2018)
(finding that medical cannabis access laws reduced opioid prescriptions among the Medicaid population).
Focusing on the general population—and not just individuals covered by Medicare or Medicaid, a recent study
concluded that recreational cannabis access laws and medical cannabis access laws reduced opioid prescriptions
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marijuana might influence the relationship between pharmaceutical payments
and prescriptions. To ensure that cannabis access laws do not influence the
difference in payment effect for PDMP observations and non-PDMP
observations, we control for the enactment of these laws. Figure 6173 reports the
results from models that include controls for medical cannabis access laws. The
results are quite similar to those reported in Figure 5. Accordingly, our
conclusions about the effect of PDMPs on the relationship between payments
and prescription rates are not impacted by the availability of medical cannabis.
Given the strength of our results, and the fact that these results demonstrate a
persuasive function of opioid-related payments—in technical terms, we find
support for both Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2—we explore the implications
of these results in the next Part.
Figure 6. Effect of Pharmaceutical Payment on Opioid
Prescription Rate, by PDMP Status, Controlling for Cannabis Laws

(as measured in morphine milligram equivalents) by 11.8% and 4.2%, respectively. McMichael et al., supra note
141, at 1.
173. The difference in effect is significant at the 10% level for the first, third, fourth, and fifth categories.
The difference in effect is also significant at the 5% significance level for the first, fourth, and fifth categories.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PAYMENTS AND
PRESCRIPTIONS
With the explosion of lawsuits against opioid manufacturers in recent
years, understanding the relationships between these manufacturers and the
healthcare providers who prescribe their products has never been more
important. The results of our empirical analysis provide unique insight into these
continuing—and troubling—relationships. In this Part, we begin by exploring
the nature of these relationships as elucidated by the empirical analysis above
and contextualizing our results within the ongoing opioid litigation. We then
explore the (unintended) policy implications raised by our results.
A. CONTEXTUALIZING THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Given the sheer number of claims that comprise the ongoing opioid
litigation, it comes as no surprise that no single theory of liability underlies every
claim. However, as discussed above, two theories of liability that permeate many
suits are that (1) opioid manufacturers engaged in false or misleading advertising
and (2) instead of reporting suspicious orders, opioid manufacturers targeted
high-prescribing physicians for additional detailing.174 The results of our
empirical analysis above are generally consistent with both theories of liability.
Indeed, even examining data on legal payments demonstrates the continued
existence of troubling relationships between manufacturers and prescribers.
Moreover, these are the types of relationships that must be present if either of
these general theories can support liability on the part of manufacturers. Without
a strong connection between manufacturers and prescribers, it would prove
exceedingly difficult for manufacturers to offer false or misleading
advertisements to prescribers convincingly. Similarly, the types of relationships
highlighted by our results are the types that one would expect to see if, instead
of monitoring and reporting unusual shipments, opioid manufacturers were
targeting prescribers for increased opioid prescriptions.
Importantly, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that not only does
a significant relationship exist between pharmaceutical payments and opioid
prescription rates, but that this relationship has persisted through the latter part
of the opioid crisis.175 The continuation of this relationship into the later years
of the crisis—when drugs such as heroin and fentanyl have played larger roles
than prescription opioids—suggests that the behavior of pharmaceutical
companies plays an important role in physicians’ decisions to prescribe opioids.
While the evidence reported above does not necessarily demonstrate any
behavior that would subject manufacturers to criminal or civil liability, the
174. See supra Part I.C.
175. As previously mentioned, these results are not meant to estimate the causal effect of an additional dollar
on prescription rates. Instead, the results document correlations between the prescription rates and payment tiers
and describe how these correlations change in the presence of PDMP laws. The implications of these patterns
correspond to the predictions of payments serving persuasive functions rather than purely educational ones.
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strong and continued relationship between pharmaceutical company payments
and physician opioid prescriptions suggests that these companies continue to
encourage opioid prescriptions deep into the opioid crisis.
Not only does the association between payments and prescribing rates
remain statistically significant despite the presence of illegal alternatives, such
as heroin and illicitly manufactured fentanyl, the magnitude of this association
increases with the tier of spending. This increase is consistent with the notion
that physicians receiving much larger payments from pharmaceutical companies
are affected in a qualitatively different way than those receiving minimal
amounts.
In general, this pattern of effects may be consistent either with payments
serving legitimate educational functions or with payments serving to encourage
more opioid prescriptions. The second phase of our analysis, however,
demonstrates that the latter is true. The fact that PDMPs have a clear impact on
the relationship between payments and prescribing rates demonstrates the
persuasive (as opposed to educational) function of payments from opioid
manufacturers. While we cannot definitively say that this persuasive role is a
function of an incentive structure (with providers targeted to encourage more
prescriptions) or a reward structure (with high-prescribing providers receiving
payments as rewards), our results indicate the existence of persuasive payments
generally.
Though our analysis primarily relied on PDMPs as a mechanism by which
to differentiate between persuasive and educational payments, the results of that
analysis elucidate an important, if unintended, effect of PDMPs. The next
Subpart explores that effect.
B. THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING
PROGRAMS
In general, the results of this empirical analysis demonstrate that PDMP
laws mitigate the association between pharmaceutical payments and opioid
prescription rates. States that adopted PMDP laws over time have a weaker
association between pharmaceutical payments and opioid prescription rates.
This effect persists even after controlling for the emergence of a pain relief
alternative, cannabis. While this pattern of results is consistent with
pharmaceutical payments serving a persuasive function, it has important
implications in and of itself. Chief among these implications is the potential of
PDMPs to attenuate the relationships between prescribers and manufacturers.
In general, PDMPs may reduce the effect of pharmaceutical payments on
opioid rates via at least three different mechanisms. First, as PDMP laws were
established in order to provide healthcare providers with information on what
prescriptions their patients were receiving, it is possible that these programs
corrected providers’ beliefs about their patients’ other prescriptions. Our results
provide support for this mechanism of effect, as we see a consistently stronger

March 2021]

CONTAMINATED RELATIONSHIPS

867

impact of PDMPs on providers receiving higher levels of payments. This
suggests that PDMPs may correct misconceptions among these providers that
opioids are under-prescribed—misconceptions that pharmaceutical companies
have been accused of perpetuating.
Second, though states did not establish PDMPs to expose providers to
greater liability, it is possible that prescribers perceive a greater risk of liability
or disciplinary action for over-prescription if a PDMP is in place. In response,
physicians receiving payments from pharmaceutical companies may reduce the
number of prescriptions they make in order to avoid scrutiny. This would be an
unintended “accountability” effect of PDMPs.
Third, as noted above, other researchers have found that companies reduce
payments to prescribers following the adoption of a PDMP.176 Given this
finding, our results may stem in part from a general reduction in pharmaceutical
payments after the adoption of a PDMP. Because we group payments into tiers
by state and year, we do not measure the effect of nominal payments over time;
instead, we compare physicians to their in-state peers in a given year.
Accordingly, if the pharmaceutical company generally spends less in the year
following a PDMP enactment, a physician may receive significantly lower
payments in the year following a PDMP enactment but remain in the same tier
in both years. Insofar as prescription rates are sensitive to the level of payments,
a fascinating corollary presents itself. If pharmaceutical companies reduce
payments to physicians after the implementation of a PDMP law, this suggests
that they believe that their payments incentivize physicians to prescribe opioids
and that PDMP laws might chill this effect. Proving this corollary is beyond the
scope of this Article, but these potential explanations confirm the practical
importance of these results.
In general, while we cannot isolate the exact mechanism by which PDMPs
attenuate the relationship between payments and prescription rates, we can
confidently say that PDMPs have this effect overall. Thus, our results suggest
that PDMPs have the (likely unintended) effect of reducing the effectiveness of
pharmaceutical payments in terms of the ability of these payments to encourage
more opioid prescriptions. While this potentially unintended effect may appear
rather mundane at first, it has profound implications. At their most basic level,
persuasive payments from pharmaceutical companies create important conflicts
of interest. Physicians may be induced to prescribe more opioids when these
additional prescriptions are not in patients’ bests interests. Addressing this type
of conflict of interest has proven exceedingly difficult in the past. Indeed, a
recent study investigated the role of these conflicts in depth.177 Disclosure of the

176. Nguyen et al., supra note 128, at 23–37.
177. Susannah L. Rose, Sunita Sah, Raed Dweik, Cory Schmidt, MaryBeth Mercer, Ariane Mitchum,
Michael Kattan, Matthew Karafa & Christopher Robertson, Patient Responses to Physician Disclosures of
Industry Conflicts of Interest: A Randomized Field Experiment, ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
(forthcoming 2021).
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underlying conflict is the most recommended method for addressing issues
surrounding conflicts of interest. However, a randomized field experiment had
little impact on patients’ trust of their providers.178 Thus, to the extent
policymakers wish to address conflicts of interest, using PDMPs to reduce the
payments that create these conflicts in the first place may be an attractive
strategy.
Returning to the central focus of this Article, PDMPs may also be a viable
option to undercut the relationships that may support the behavior alleged by
plaintiffs in the ongoing opioid litigation. By undermining these relationships—
even though the relationships we examine are perfectly legal—PDMPs may
undercut the ability of manufacturers to engage in the conduct alleged by
plaintiffs. Furthermore, decreasing the prominence and effectiveness of false
and misleading advertising by weakening the relationships that facilitate it can
only aid patients. Similarly, undermining the ability of manufacturers to target
high-prescribing (or potentially high-prescribing) providers can also help
patients avoid becoming addicted to opioids in the first instance. Importantly,
these potential benefits of PDMPs exist in addition to the already welldocumented benefits these programs have in terms of reducing opioid
prescriptions generally.179

CONCLUSION
Representing the greatest threat to public health of this generation, the
opioid crisis has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans.180
Unlike past public health crises, like the HIV epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s,
the opioid epidemic arose within the healthcare system itself. While this
highlights clear problems within that system, it also means that victims of the
current crisis have access to legal redress—something victims of natural
epidemics have never had. Thousands of lawsuits seeking this redress have been
filed against opioid manufacturers. These claims rely on many different theories
of liability, but two important allegations are common to many of these suits:
(1) opioid manufacturers produced false and misleading advertising, and (2)
manufacturers not only failed to monitor the supply of opioids but targeted
certain high-prescribing providers.
These common allegations—along with many others—depend critically on
the relationships that exist between manufacturers and the healthcare providers
that prescribe their products. Despite the importance of these relationships,
however, little empirical evidence on the nature and strength of these

178. Id.
179. See supra notes 122–127 and accompanying text.
180. The Drug Overdose Epidemic: Behind the Numbers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html#:~:text=Overdoses%20involving%20opioids%20killed%2
0nearly,those%20deaths%20involved%20prescription%20opioids.&text=Learn%20more%20about%20the%2
0Data,epidemic%20in%20the%20United%20States (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
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relationships exists. This Article fills that gap by providing novel and robust
evidence on the association between payments made by pharmaceutical
companies and the opioid prescription rates of individual healthcare providers
who receive those payments. The results of the analysis reported here
demonstrate a positive relationship between payments and prescribing rates,
with providers receiving more money from pharmaceutical companies
prescribing more opioids.
While the association between payments and prescribing rates may be the
result of different activities undertaken by pharmaceutical companies—some
more legitimate than others—our analysis demonstrates that these payments
primarily serve to incentivize or reward more opioid prescriptions. Our analysis
is limited to legal payments and cannot establish any liability on the part of
manufacturers. However, it can, and does, clearly establish the existence of
troubling relationships—relationships that persist deep into the opioid crisis.
Indeed, the relationships evinced by the data are exactly the type that could
facilitate the behavior alleged by plaintiffs in the current opioid litigation. As
plaintiffs continue to fight for compensation, this continued contamination may
prove a useful foundation on which to build their claims. The persistence of these
results through the tail of the opioid crisis cautions against a conclusion that
contamination of medical judgment is entirely behind us. Interventions that
weaken the impact of this relationship—like state PDMP laws—may be the best
defense against the next crisis.
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